The Role of Social Distrust in Risk-Benefit Analysis: A Study of the Siting of a Hazardous Waste Disposal Facility by Groothuis, Peter & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
Groothuis, P.A. and Miller, G. (1997) The Role of Social Distrust in Risk-Benefit Analysis: A Study of the Siting of a 
Hazardous Waste Disposal Facility, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 15(3): 241-257 (Nov 1997). Published by 






The Role of Social Distrust in Risk-Benefit Analysis: A 
Study of the Siting of a Hazardous Waste Disposal 
Facility 








Distrust of social institutions is becoming an important component of risk communication and 
policy analysis. To assess the impact of social distrust on decision making, we examine the role 
of distrust of information sources on the willingness to accept a hazardous waste disposal 
facility in one's neighborhood. Using a prospective reference utility model, distrust of information 
sources is analyzed a possible influence on individual choice in a risk-benefit tradeoff. Using 
contingent valuation survey data on the siting of a hazardous waste disposal facility, we find that 
respondents are particularly distrustful of both governmental officials and waste disposal 
businesses. We find that social distrust increases the perceived risk of a facility and influences 
the likelihood of accepting a referendum to site a hazardous waste disposal facility. The level of 
compensation offered in the contingent valuation scenario also is found to influence a 
respondent's risk perception. 
  
Compensation is recognized as a potential component in the solution to the 'not-in-mybackyard' 
(NIMBY) impasse. The recognition of real costs borne by people who live near 
a noxious facility legitimizes the introduction of mechanisms and procedures that provide 
compensation (Kunreuther and Easterling 1996; O'Hare and Sanderson 1993; and Swallow, 
Opaluch and Weaver 1992). In a review of numerous studies regarding compensation 
and siting, Kunreuther and Easterling (1996) conclude that compensation may be a valuable 
tool in siting less noxious facilities, but appears to have little positive effect when 
siting facilities viewed as extremely risky. In many cases compensation is likely to elicit 
a negative response that has been characterized as a bribe when risk to personal healtli and 
the local environment are salient. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1996) and Frey, Oberholzer- 
Gee, and Eichenberger (1996) suggest that compensation, when considered a bribe, will 
crowd out any moral obligations to accept the facility and citizens may interpret the 
project as immoral or illegitimate. Such attitudes may lead to more violent protests and 
strategic behavior that results in society bearing greater costs for the siting than necessary. 
The limits of compensation appear to closely defined by the concept of risk. Kunreuther 
and Easterling (1990) find that individuals are more concerned with the ability to measvire 
the hazards ofa facility than with any level of compensation. Inhaber (1992) suggests that 
compensation may be present in a siting debate but it is a secondary, sufficient condition 
while risk communication and control is the dominant, necessary condition. Kasperson, 
Golding and Tuler (1992) argue that compensation cannot substitute for safety assurances. 
They further argue that offering compensation for risk (rather than attempts at reducing 
risk) increases social distrust thus making compensation unacceptable. Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee (1996) speculate that offers of compensation may be used as signals of 
risk by individuals causing increased compensation to lead to increases in an individual's 
perceived risk of the facility. Freudenburg and Pastor (1992) suggest that the public's 
overestimation ofthe risks of such facilities arises from a more fundamental distrust ofthe 
information sources, causing individuals to be prudent in their decision making processes. 
 
The concept of social distrust has emerged as a particularly relevant issue when the 
element of risk to property and person is present. Frewer, Hedderley and Sheppard (1996) 
find that expertise in itself does not lead to trust but sources as seen to be characterized 
by positive attributes such as accountability and concem for the public welfare tend to be 
found more credible. Kunreuther and Slovic (1996) caution that technical analysis alone 
does little to reduce distrust but concems over process, power, participation, and decision 
making play a greater role. Prescriptive advice regarding the necessity to build trust has 
appeared in the literature. (Leiss 1996, O'Hare and Sanderson 1993). 
Kasperson, et al. (1992) sees the loss of social trust as a broad fundamental societal 
phenomena and describes a process for risk communication that recognizes the role of 
prior information and the level of distrust towards the participants. Drawing on the concepts 
of (a) self reports of being informed (about the waste facility issue) and (b) a 
summary judgment of distrust of the various actors in the siting drama, our study incorporates 
these two a priori elements into a risk-benefit model that includes an offer of 
compensation for accepting the facility. Using a prospective reference utility model in a 
risk-benefit trade-off scenario, we empirically analyze the role of distrust and prior information. 
 
 
1. THE MODEL 
 
As in previous analyses of hazardous waste policy and noxious siting decisions, we model 
the individual decisions in an expected utility framework, where the uncertainty arises 
fi'om the adverse outcome from exposure to the facility (Kunreuther and Easterling 1990; 
Smith and Desvouseges 1986; and duVair and Loomis 1993). The adverse outcome in this 
case is treated as a reduction in health status. Therefore, we apply the WTA framework 
using a health state approach that is described in more detail in the formal model (Cook 
and Graham 1977; Viscusi and Evans 1990; Johannesson et al., 1993). Following Viscusi 
(1989), we frame the probability of adverse health outcome as a subjective measure of 
risk, where individuals update their risk beliefs by obtaining information and weighting 
their updates by the credibility of the information source. 
Fonnally, suppose that households gain utility from health and income. Solution of the 
utility maximization problem yields the state dependent indirect utility function with price 
terms suppressed 
 
U = v(H, y)       (1) 
 
where U is the reference utility level, H is exogenous health status, and y is income. If 
indirect utility is additively separable in health and income, let the utility associated with 
good health be: 
 
v(H = 1, y) = h(1) + m(y)      (2) 
 
With poor health the utility level is: 
 
V(H = 0, y) = h(0) + m(y)     (3) 
 
Suppose that without a hazardous waste landfill households face a probability of good 
health of 1. With a hazardous waste landfill the probability of good health is perceived to 
be p*, where p* = {Ψp + Ψg}/(Ψ + ф), and Ψ is the weight given the individual's prior 
perceived probability of good health, p, and ф is the weight given the information sources 
reported probability of good health, q (Viscusi 1989). Then the expected indirect utility 
without the hazardous waste landfill is: 
 
E(vq) = m(y) + h(1) = m(y) + h(0) + [h(1) – h(0)]  (4) 
 
Expected indirect utility with the hazardous waste landfill is: 
 
E(vp) = m(y) + h(0) + p*[h(1) – h(0)]    (5) 
 
The value of avoiding the hazardous waste landfill under uncertainty about health status 
is the minimum willingness to accept under uncertainty {WTA): 
 
m(y) + [h(1) – h(0)] = m(y + WTA) + p*[h(1) – h(0)]  (6) 
 
assuming that accepting the WTA amount allows the landfill to be sited which reduces the 
perceived probability of good health. 
 
A referendum on siting the hazardous waste landfill presents to households the question: 
"Would you accept $A for good health with certainty, to p* probability of good 
health?" which creates the problem: 
 
m(y) + [h(1) – h(0)] (<) = (>) m(y + A) + p*[h(1) – h(0)] (7) 
li A > (<) WTA then the respondent will vote "yes" ("no") in the referendum from 
equation (7). Following subtraction and simplification: 
Dv = m(y + A) – m(y) + (p* - 1)[h(1) – h(0)]  (8) 
 
where Dv is the change in the expected indirect utility function. The interpretation of this 
function is in two parts. The first, m(y + A) – m(y), is the increase in utility from the 
compensation offered to the neighborhood. The second, (p* -  l)[h(l) - h(0)] is the 
decrease in utility from the expected change in health status. The change in the expected 
indirect utility function has several important properties with the assumption of additive 
separabihty. With respect to income, 
 
ðDv/ð y = ð m(y + A)/ ð y – m(y)/ ð y < 0  (9) 
 
if the marginal utility of income is diminishing with additional income. 
As the weight given prior subjective probability of good health changes, 
 
ð Dv/ð Ψ = -{p – p*}/(Ψ + ф)[h(1) – h(0)] < 0  (10) 
 
if the prior probability,/?, is less than/)* which occurs if p is greater than q. This indicates 
that as individuals increase the weight to prior risk assessment rather than new sources of 
information will see a decrease in utility due to the greater probability of poor health. 
As the weight given new sources of risk assessment, 
 
ðDv/ðф = -{q – p*}/(Ψ + ф)[h(1) – h(0)] > 0   (11) 
 
which is positive when the reported probability, q, is greater than p*, which is the case 
when the reported probability of good health is greater than the perceived level of good 
health. As the perceived probability of good health changes, 
 




ð Dv/ð p = Ψ/(Ψ + ф)[h(1) – h(0)] > 0  (13) 
 
both are positive because as the probability of good health increases ones utility increases. 
Lastly as the level of compensation changes, 
 
ð Dv/ð A = ð m(y + A)/ ð A > 0   (14) 
 
since the marginal utility of income is positive. 
 
This prospective-reference utility model suggests that an individual's decision depends 
upon not only the amount of compensation offered but upon an individuals risk assessment 
and the weight given information provided by various sources. The weight respondents 
give to the various information sources is influenced by the level of distrust each 




2. THE INSTRUMENT 
 
Measures of prior information, distrust of information sources and perceived risk were 
obtained using a mail survey. This instrument was distributed to 900 head-of-households 
in Lawrence County, Pennsylvania in the spring of 1992. Lawrence County, located forty 
miles north of Pittsburgh has New Castle as its largest city, by virtue of its rural nature and 
proximity to major industrial centers, has been targeted several times prior to 1992 as a 
potential site for a hazardous waste disposal facility. The survey consisted of one primary 
mailing, a post card reminder, and one replacement instrument. The response rate was 41 
percent. 
 
Implementation of CV requires a description of the disamenity, a payment rule, a policy 
rule, and a question of behavioral intention. Information about the type of hazardous 
waste the landfill would accept, the amount of monitoring the state would provide, and a 
baseline of risk was provided in the survey. (See Appendix for full text of questions.) The 
behavioral intention question used was a dichotomous choice willingness-to-accept {WTA) 
question framed as follows: 
 
Suppose the State proposes to locate the hazardous waste landfill in your county. In 
return the State proposes to compensate people by reducing State income taxes by $A 
per family in your county per year. Would you be willing to accept this proposal? 
 
In the survey the offer amount, $A, ranged from $100 to $2000. These amounts were 
chosen from a preliminary study using an open ended WTA question. Respondents were 
then given three alternatives: 'YES' 'NO' and 'DONT KNOW'. We follow the NOAA 
panel (Arrow et al. 1993) recommendation that don't know responses need to be included 
in CV analysis. The don't know responses are treated as "yes" responses to provide a 
conservative estimate of WTA following the recommendation of Mitchell and Carson 
(1989). Follow up questions were used to identify protest responses. 
 
Prior to the CV scenario, the questionnaire asked for self reports of the level of prior 
information regarding the issues of siting a hazardous waste facility. This rather global 
item was measured with a five point Likert scale anchored by 'not at all informed' to 'very 
informed.' Ten agencies that often become principal players and/or information sources in 
the siting process were assessed as to the level of distrust held by the respondent. Distrust 
was measured on a five point Likert scale anchored by 'trust a lot' to 'trust none'. 
Individuals' risk perceptions were obtained by asking a perceived risk question that was 
stated "How likely do you feel a "problem" would arise at some future time (20-30 years) 
from a hazardous landfill?" The response used a Likert scale anchored by 1 NOT AT ALL 
LIKELY, 3 LIKELY to 5 VERY LIKELY. (See Appendix full text of questions). 
 
3. THE DATA 
 
Table 1 reports the means of the self-reports of prior information (Informed), perceived 
risk with respect to one's health (Perceived Risk), and distrust of the ten actors. The mean 
of Informed indicates that individuals feel informed about the siting issues while the mean 
of Perceived Risk suggests that respondents believe that a hazardous waste facility is 
likely to harm one's health when residing near it. 
 
The highest levels of distrust are for waste disposal business, state government 
representatives, 
and local county/township officials in that order. Media and governmental 
agencies (EPA and state DER) were given moderate amounts of distrust. Low levels of 
distrust were for personal sources of information: families and friends and for environmental 
group spokespersons. College research reports were given the lowest level of 
distrust of the ten actors. The level of distrust of the information from various sources may 
arise because the risk measures differ between professional affiliation (Lynn 1986). Individuals 
receiving different information from each source must decide upon the value of 
the information given. Our results are consistent with Frewer, Hedderly and Shepherd 
(1996) who find government and business tend exhibit' the greatest amount of distrust. 




The mean level of distrust among the various actors supports Kasperson et al.'s (1992) 
observance that a broad based loss of trust in leaders of social institutions may have 
occurred. One may extend their argument and suggest that even the media, the basis for 
an informed society, has suffered degradation of trust to the point that they may not be 
credible in such highly controversial issues such as the siting of a hazardous waste facility. 
The high trust rating given to environmental groups, and family and friends also signal a 
retreat from trusting impersonal agencies who are presumed to act in the best interests of 
the public. The high (relative) regard given to college research reports express source 
credibility likely attributed to an agency that has no material interest in the project and is 
reputed to be evenhanded in generating information. 
 
4. DETERMINANTS OF DISTRUST 
 
To determine if respondent's social distrust was particular to each actor or if a more 
generalized distrust of various institutions, a principal component analysis was performed 
(Hair, Anderson, and Tatham 1987). The factor analysis suggests that the distrust of the 
actors may be summarized into three broad categories that are labeled as Government, 
News, and Authorities. Table 2 illustrates the rotated factor structure (varimax procedure) 
and the emergent factors. The factor structure summarizes the individual informational 
sources fairly well. The first factor's, Government, strongest loadings were from the 
DER, the EPA, state govemment representatives, and local/township officials. The second 
factor. News, consisted of loadings from television and radio reports, news paper reports, 
and reports from family and friends. Authorities, the third factor, had the strongest 
loadings from college research reports, environmental group spokespersons and waste 
disposal businesses. Waste disposal business, however, loads with a negative value that 
indicates respondents who view environmental groups and college research reports as 





The perceived level of prior information about hazardous waste facilities, as well as 
demographics of income, age, number of children may have some predictive ability in 
estimating the level of distrust respondents report of the various actors. To explore these 
connections, we report six regressions: three using the emergent factor scores and three 
using the main actors. We identify the three main actors as the DER, waste disposal 
business and environmental spokespersons chosen because they play a most active role in 
the siting decision. 
Table 3 reports the regressions with the summarized factor scores of distrust as the 
dependent variable. We find that those expressing a greater level of prior information and 
older individuals exhibit less distrust of the news media. We also find that individuals 
expressing a greater level of prior information show less distrust of authorities, while 
older respondents and respondents with higher incomes tend to be more distrustful of 
authorities. In Table 4, we report a second set of regressions using the raw scores on 
distrust of the most salient actors: the DER, waste disposal business, and environmental 
group spokespersons. Age is found to be a significant predictor of distrust in all three 
regressions. Older respondents are more distrustful of the DER and environmental groups 
and less distrustful of waste disposal businesses. Income is found to be a significant 
predictor of distrust of waste disposal business and environmental groups. Low income 
individuals are found to be more distrustful of waste disposal business and less distrustful 
of environmental groups than high income respondents. The level of prior information is 
found to be a significant predictor of only distrust in environmental groups. Respondents 








These results suggest that both young and low income individuals are highly distrustful 
of waste disposal businesses, while both young, low income individuals and individuals 
who report being well informed are highly trustful of information provided by environmental 
groups. Older respondents seem to express a somewhat greater trust of business.' 
To further our understanding of the role of distrust, we explore how distrust influences the 
perceived risk of a hazardous waste facility. 
 
 
5. DETERMINANTS OF PERCEIVED RISK 
 
In Table 5, we report the results of two regression specifications on perceived health risks 
of a hazardous waste disposal facility. Our analysis indicates that social distrust, the level 
of the offer in the CV question and a respondent's income level all influence the perceived 





In both specifications, we find that as income rises, individuals perceive hazardous 
waste facilities as less of a health risk. This result is consistent with Bonjean and Grimes 
(1974) who argue that respondents with higher income believe they have more control 
over life decisions.^ In addition, we find that self reports of being informed do not 
influence risk perceptions. This find supports conclusions by Kunreuther and Slovic 
(1996) and Leiss (1996) that information is less valued than trust in actors in the siting 
dilemma. 
We do, however, find that distrust plays a significant role in the perception of risk. In the 
first specification, using the factor scores, we find that greater distrust in government and 
news media decreases the belief that hazardous waste facilities are safe, while greater 
level distrust. 
 
in authorities increases the perception that facilities are safe. In the second specification, 
we find that distrust of all three main actors influences the level of perceived risk. 
Distrust in waste disposal businesses and distrust in the department of environmental 
resources (DER) increases the level of perceived health risk. Individuals who distrust 
these two actors, both who play the primary role in the siting process in Pennsylvania, do 
not take the information given from these sources as credible. Distrust in environmental 
group spokespersons, however, lowers the level of perceived risk. The results in both 
specifications indicate that social distrust of government and business leads to increased 
perception that hazardous waste facilities are harmful to one's health. 
 
In addition, we find that the level of offer presented in the CV scenario significantly 
influences the level of perceived risk in a convex fashion. In both specifications the 
coefficient on offer is negative while offer squared is positive and significant. The convex 
function reaches a minimum at approximately $1100. Thus indicating that respondents 
who were assigned low values of compensation ($100 and $500) and high values of 
compensation ($ 1500 and $2000) had a higher perceived risk of a hazardous waste landfill 
than respondents with middle ranges ($1000). The coefficient on offer squared supports 
Freudenburg and Pastor (1992) conjecture that social distrust leads individuals to be 
suspicions in their decision making believing that money should be spent on risk reduction 
and not on compensation. It also supports Frey and Oberholzer-Gee's (1996) notion 
that offer may signal information about the level of risk. 
 
In addition offer may signal respondent's on the credibility of the actors with low offers 
of compensation signaling that actors that are not credible and serious and very high offers 
signaling that the risk is higher than initially thought. In both cases, our analysis suggests 
that the level of compensation provides information to respondents that they use to update 
their risk assessment. 
 
 
6. CONTINGENT VALUATION EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
To analyze the role of risk assessment, social distrust and compensation we perform a CV 
analysis where measures of trust and prior information are included in a logit analysis of 
yes/no votes. In Table 6, we report the results of two specifications. The first includes the 
trust measures of the main actors: the; DER, environmental groups, and waste disposal 
business. The second specification includes the factor scores that summarize the trust 
measures into three information sources: Authorities, News and Government. 
 
In both specifications the probability of a yes vote increases with the amount of the 
offer and decreases with increases in income. The positive coefficient on offer suggests 
that compensation does play a role in the acceptance of a facility in one's neighborhood. 
We find that a $1000 increase in offer raises the probability of saying yes by about 16%. 
The negative coefficient on income is consistent with diminishing marginal utility of 
income and also indicates that neighborhood quality is a normal good where a $10,000 




In addition the probability of a yes vote also decreases with age where an 10 year 
increase in age lowers the likelihood of voting yes by 7.7%. This result is consistent with 
older respondents being more concerned with health status. The number of children in a 
household, however, does not have a statistically significant influence the likelihood of a 
yes vote. 
 
We also find that in both specifications the level of prior information has no significant 
effect on a yes vote. We also-find that the more respondents view waste disposal facilities 
as likely to exhibit problems, the less likely a yes response. We find that a one unit 
increase on our Likert scale lowers the likelihood of acceptance by about 16.5 percent. 
This is consistent with a risk benefit analysis where increased perceptions of risk lower the 
likelihood of acceptance. 
 
We also find that trust of information sources plays key role in the acceptance of the 
offer. In the first specification, which focuses on the main actors, we find that with more 
distrust of a waste disposal business the less likely a yes response. Here we find that a one 
unit increase in distrust lowers the likelihood of acceptance by eleven percent. Conversely, 
the greater the distrust of environmental groups the more likely a yes vote: a one unit 
increase in distrust increases the likelihood of acceptance by 7.6%. Distrust in the DER 
has significant effect on the referendum with a one unit increase in distrust leading to a 
five percent decrease in the likelihood of voting yes. 
In the second specification, that includes the summarized factor scores, increases in 
distrust of Government decreases the likelihood of a yes vote by 8.6%. While increases 
in distrust of Authorities (environmental groups and college research reports) increases 
the likelihood of voting yes by eleven percent. Distrust of the News, however, has no 
significant effect on the referendum. These results suggest that social distrust not only 
influences the perceived level of risk but also directly influences the likelihood of acceptance 
of a LULU. As individuals distrust in business and government increases, the more 
compensation necessary to site a hazardous waste facility. This result is consistent with 





Social distrust is a phenomenon that economists must take into account when analyzing 
the NIMBY impasse. In our analysis, we find that individuals, in particular both younger 
and lower income, are distrustful of waste disposal business and the government. Our 
results follow the same pattern found by Frewer et al. (1996) where sources that are 
perceived to have a vested interest are the most distrusted. 
 
We also find that, individuals who are distrustful of government, news media, and 
business exhibit higher levels of perceived risk of a hazardous waste disposal facility 
suggesting that individuals, who are distrustful, may not accept risk information from 
these sources as credible and may amplify their risk assessment. Respondents may use the 
level of the offer of compensation as a signal on the credibility of actors or on the level 
of risk of a facility. In particular, very low levels of compensation may signal that 
respondents that the actors are not credible which increases their perception of risk while 
very high levels of compensation may signal that the waste facility is of higher risk than 
initially perceived. This in part supports the Frey, Oberholzer-Gee (1996) conclusion that 
high levels of compensation may signal the implied risk of a facility; however, our 
analysis shows that low levels of compensation also may signal the lack of credibility of 
the actors. 
 
Our analysis further suggests that distruist-of-information-sources measure may serve as 
a proxy for a deeper, abiding distrust of waste disposal facilities and of government. In a 
siting decision individuals are asked to enter into a long term relation with a firm as well 
as a government monitor. They are asked to accept the facility in their neighborhood 
today, but the firm operates over a very long period. Given this situation, a firm's reputation 
matters and our measure of distrust may signal that respondents perceive that 
government and business are likely to renege on agreements about the quantity of waste 
the facility will hold, length of duration, or level of safety. 
 
The introduction of social distrust as a contributing factor in the siting debate supports 
the Kunrether and Easteriing (1996) conclusion that compensation plays less of a role in 
the siting of high risk facilities. We suggest that social distrust of the primary actors in a 
siting drama leads individuals to be suspicious in their decision making process. We do, 
however, want to stress that our analysis finds that compensation does positively influence 
the likelihood of accepting a facility in our CV analysis. Thus compensation leads to a 
conundrum: it is necessary for community acceptance but it may also be used by respondents 
as a signal about both the level of risk and credibility of the actors. 
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A. Information sheet provided respondents 
 
Some Information on Hazardous Waste 
 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of Pennsylvania 
Department of Resources (DER) define hazardous waste as substances that are in the 
following four categories. 
 
Ignitable—highly flammable 
Corrosive—capable of corroding metal 
Reactive—explosive or capable of creating toxic fumes 
Toxic—harmful or fatal if swallowed 
 
In Pennsylvania, there are more than 2000 listed ha2ardous wastes. Manufacturing 
industries produce most of this waste. Examples include pickle liquor from the steel 
industry, waste from refining petroleum, and wood preservatives. The state of Pennsylvania 
produces nineteen million tons of hazardous waste each year. Of this waste, eight 
hundred thousand tons needs to be disposed of in commercial facilities. The steel industry 
produces half of the hazardous waste in Pennsylvania. 
 
Hazardous waste threatens human life, human health, or the environment when improperly 
stored, treated or disposed. The State of Pennsylvania has strict regulations on the 
operation of hazardous waste landfills. The State closely checks hazardous waste landfills 
with quarterly inspections, ground water inspections, and unannounced inspections. These 
inspections make sure all regulations are followed. If hazardous waste landfills follow all 
regulations then they are considered safe. 
 
B. Survey Questions 
 
Section A. Your knowledge and opinions about hazardous waste 
 
Al. Before you received this questionnaire, did you know about the issues of locating 




A3. How much would you trust the information you receive about hazardous waste from 
the following sources? 
 
 
Section B. A hypothetical hazardous waste proposal 
 
B.I Suppose the State was considering locating a hazardous waste landfill that collects 
waste from Western Pennsylvania industries in one of the following counties: Clarion, 
Lawrence, or Mercer. 
 
Suppose the State proposes to locate the hazardous waste landfill in your county. In 
return the State proposes to compensate people by reducing State income tax by $A per 




3. DONT KNOW 
 
If you answered YES to question 3, which BEST describes why? 
 
1. THE TAX REDUCTION APPEALED TO ME. 
2. HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES ARE SAFE. 
3. HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES CREATE JOBS FOR THE COMMUNITY. 
4. HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES NEED TO GO SOMEWHERE. 
 
If you answered NO to question 3, which BEST describes why? 
 
1. THE TAX REDUCTION WAS NOT ENOUGH 
2. THE STATE DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO LOCATE HAZARDOUS WASTE 
    FACILITIES 
3. THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH INFORMATION ON THE HAZARDS OF THE FACILITY 
4. HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES SHOULD GO SOME PLACE ELSE 
 
If you answered DONT KNOW to question 3, which best describes why? 
 
1. I NEED MORE INFORMATION 
2. I DIDNT UNDERSTAND THE QUESTION 
3. I AM NOT SURE HOW THE TAX CUT OR THE HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY 
    AFFECTS MY HOUSEHOLD 
4. I DISAGREE WITH THE QUESTION 
 
Section C. Your knowledge and opinion about risk 
 
We read about facilities that have some environmental risks due to spills, residues or other 
accidents. How likely do you feel a "problem" would arise at some future time (20-30 







1. These results suggest two interpretations. The first interpretation: individuals of different 
demographic group have attributes that influence their level of trust, i.e.. Older individuals come 
from an era when businesses were view with less skepticism. The second interpretation: 
individuals have more trust of information sources that agree with their own assessment, i.e. an 
individual perceives low risk and distrusts sources of information that disagrees with their 
assessment. Our analysis does not imply causation. Our analysis only identifies individuals who 
exhibit different levels of distrust. 
 
2. A respondents income level may proxy for the notion that low income neighborhoods are at 
tbe greatest risk of having a facility sited and low come individuals have the least access to 
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